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THE HAGUE RULES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARBITRATION: WHAT THE
DRAFTERS GOT RIGHT AND WRONG
BY

Kelsey Berndt*
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has become an increasingly popular substitute for the traditional judicial
system due to its efficient and private nature.1 Human rights has more recently joined the
mix of arbitrable subjects.2 As the international community is becoming increasingly aware
of the “relationship between business and human rights,” the international community has
also become increasingly anxious for business and human rights arbitration as well as rules
to dictate the arbitration.3 Arbitration may be appealing to victims of human rights
violations for a variety of reasons.
First, arbitration is more efficient and less expensive than traditional litigation, as
well as confidential.4 Aside from these traditional commercial reasons for arbitration, for
victims of human rights violations in jurisdictions with corrupt national courts, pursuing
arbitration may be a better option than filing suit in court, because arbitration would
provide a more fair trial than the court system.5 Arbitration can offer these individuals “(i)
a neutral forum; (ii) a specialized dispute resolution process . . . [and] . . . (iii) . . . binding
awards subjected only to limited judicial review.”6
* This author is an Associate Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2021 Juris Doctor Candidate at
Penn State Law.
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The arbitration community first used the United Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UNGP) to inform decisions in human rights arbitrations.7 The
UNGP consists of a three-pillar framework.8 The first pillar is that states have existing legal
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights.9 The second pillar is that business
enterprises are required to comply with applicable laws and respect human rights.10 The
third pillar is that effective remedies need to be available when rights and obligations in
respect of human rights are infringed.11 Efforts to draft the Hague Rules on Business and
Human Rights Arbitration, based on the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency—which are rules governing investorstate arbitration—began in 2018.12 The working group—the group in charge of designing,
monitoring, and effectuating the creation of the Hague Rules—received comments both
before creating the first draft and after publishing the first draft.13 Based on these
comments, the working group finalized the Hague Rules and published them in December
of 2019.14 The Hague Rules provide insight to arbitral tribunals, as well as parties,
regarding the composition of the arbitral tribunal, arbitral proceedings, transparency, and
the eventual award.15 Although the drafters of the Hague Rules made several additons to
adapt the UNCITRAL Rules to both the business and human rights arbitration context, the
Hague Rules arguably fall short in several areas. Largely, the Hague Rules’ deficiencies
could be fixed through further clarification and increased guidance for the arbitrators and
arbitral tribunals that will conduct business and human rights arbitration. Overall, it will be
difficult to tell whether the Hague Rules effectively accomplish their purpose—providing
fair arbitration to those whose human rights have allegedly been infringed through dealings
with businesses—until parties have the opportunity to arbitrate under them.
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II. THE HAGUE RULES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration were first considered
for human rights violations arising out of business and other contracts in 2013.16 However,
a working group to create the Hague Rules was not assembled until the beginning of 2018.17
The drafters based the Hague Rules on the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treatybased Investor-State Arbitration.18 The UNCITRAL Rules, adopted in 2014 by several
countries and individual treaties, outlines which parts of arbitration should be made
available to the public.19 Signatories to the UNCITRAL Rules agree to make available to
the public: the notice of arbitration, the response to the notice of arbitration, the statement
of claim, the statement of defense and any further written statements or written submissions
by any disputing party, a list of all exhibits of documents, expert reports and witness
statements, any written submissions by the non-disputing party to the treaty and by third
persons, transcripts of hearings and orders, decisions, and awards of the arbitral tribunal.20
A. The Elements Paper
The working group first produced an Elements Paper to educate, inform, and garner
input from the potential stakeholders of business human rights arbitration.21 The paper
included over seventy questions regarding election criteria and process of nomination and
appointment of arbitrators; transparency; participation of non-disputing parties; evidence;
protection of witnesses, human rights defenders, and counsel; time-sensitive situations;
types of relief; recognition and enforcement; claims manifestly without merit; costs and
financing; and settlement by mediation.22
The Elements Paper’s consultation period ran from November 2018 until January
2019, at which point the comments were summarized and published.23 The responses came
from individuals as well as in the form of “collective contributions by companies and
business organisations, NGOs, civil society organisations, law firms, academic institutions,
16
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national governments, and IGOs.”24 The general comments the working group received
were largely out of concern for the corporate parties.25 Some commenters questioned
whether there was even a need for business human rights arbitration.26 NGOs submitted
comments with concern for claimaints.27 Comments from NGOs ranged from pushing the
working group to “propose the creation of an independent institution to administer the
[Hague] Rules and arbitration” to imploring the working group to ensure that the Hague
Rules would not “reverse the burden of proof from the claimant to the respondent.”28
B. The Comments on the First Draft of the Hague Rules on Business and Human
Rights Arbitration
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment—a “university-based applied
research center . . . dedicated to the study practice and discussion of sustainable
international investment”29—points out that companies do not want to be sued.30 To avoid
legal action, corporations have fought for a variety of limitations including “doctrines of
forum non conveniens, legal rules restricting which entitities in the corporate group can be
sued for what and where, norms shielding parent companies from liability for conduct of
their subsidiaries, and legal tools companies can use to move assets across borders and

24
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Id. Commenters believed language in the Elements Paper was prejudicial to business groups, e.g. “’victims’
(rather than ‘alleged victims’) ‘violations,’ and ‘barriers’ resulting from the corporate form;” that “the
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Rules would create a loophole of sorts in which corporations would be able to “avoid accountability . . . by
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the implementation of business human rights arbitration should not detract from “efforts to reform domestic
courts;” that “various concerns in the investor-state context are not replicated in [business human rights]
arbitration.”
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across legal entities to shield them from execution.”31 The authors—members of the
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment—acknowledge that the Hague Rules may help
alleged victims avoid some of these limitations “but only if and to the extent that companies
agree to having claims brought against them in arbitration.”32 Meaning, for the Hague
Rules to be effective, corporations must consent to these claims being brought in
arbitration, even though corporations have fought for limitations on these claims in other
contexts.33 Thus, the authors believe arbitration will only be agreed to when it is
advantageous for corporations.34
The authors note that some concerns exist regarding arbitration in general.35 They
include that “arbitration undermines substantive rights, and creates relatively unchecked
potential for abuse, and that the risks of harm fall disproportionately on the weaker party.”36
In response to these concerns, the authors argue that the drafters of the Hague Rules should
do a variety of things.37 First, the drafters should develop annotated texts of options to aid
in the pursuit of access to justice.38 This annotated guide would explain the various issues
the parties need to agree on, the available options, and “the implication of those options.”39
Second, the authors call for the drafters of the Hague Rules to develop the rules “with
claimants in mind.”40 The authors suggest that the drafters should include rules that combat
the struggles that affect claimants in any legal situation: the legal costs, the necessary
expertise, difficult substantive and procedural rules, lack of access to “information
necessary to prevail,” and the financial and legal risks associated with bringing a claim.41
The authors criticized the draft of the Hague Rules for not being written in such a claimant-
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minded way.42 For example, unsuccessful claimants must bear the burden of both their own
costs and the opposing party’s costs.43 Furthermore, the authors argue that the provisions
are vague and make it difficult for a claimant to know whether they have a valid claim that
will survive arbitration.44
C. The Final Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration
The Hague Rules are broken into six sections: introductory rules, composition of
the arbitral tribunal, arbitral proceedings, transparency, the award, and miscellaneous
provisions.45
1. Introductory rules
The introductory rules encompass the scope of application, the notice and
calculation of periods of time, the notice of arbitration, the response to the notice of
arbitration, the representation and assistance, and the appointing authority.46 One important
variation from the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency—from which the Hague Rules are
adopted—is the imposition of the requirement of written explanation for deviations from
the Hague Rules.47 The commentary included in the Rules provides the explanation for this
imposition; the purpose of the written explanation is to inhibit the amount of deviations
from the Hague Rules.48 Presumably, if a party can find a valid reason for deviating from
the Hague Rules, there is no council, body, etc. that is going to prohibit the party from
deviating, because one of the most attractive aspects of arbitration is the great autonomy
that parties have in choosing the rules that dictate how the arbitration will be conducted.49
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One of the concerns that the working group received on the Elements Paper is how
arbitral tribunals and arbitrators will ensure meaningful consent to arbitration.50 The
drafters acknowledge this concern in the commentary.51 However, the drafters failed to
implement any requirments for ensuring parties obtain this meaningful consent.52 The
drafters hold the tribunal responsible for verifying the consent of natural persons engaged
in business and human rights arbitration, yet give no instruction on how the arbitral tribunal
should verify consent.53
Another addition to the Hague Rules, unique from the UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency, is the call for tribunals to act in a more “proactive and inquisitorial” manner,
rather than adversarial when one of the parties is unrepresented.54 The rationale for this
addition is derived from the UNGP.55 The addition is a response to the fact that there is “a
negative impact on the overall fairness” of the arbitration in arbitration between an
unrepresented party and a represented party.56
Article 6 of the Hague Rules delegates the Permanent Court of Arbitration as the
default appointing authority.57 The reason for this is that the Permanent Court of
Arbitration has experience in business and human rights arbitration.58 Parties, of course,
are allowed to choose another appointing authority if they wish.59
2. Composition of the arbitral tribunal
The second section is comprised of articles regarding the number of arbitrators,
appointment of arbitrators, disclosures by and challenge of arbitrators, replacement of an

Center for International Legal Cooperation, Summary of Sounding Board Consultation Round 1 – Results
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arbitrator, repetition of hearings in the event of the replacement of an arbitrator, and
exclusion of liability.60
Article 11 is another article that was created for the Hague Rules. 61 This article is
important because it prohibits parties from appointing arbitrators who have been involved
in some manner in the situation that led to the arbitration.62 A provision like this is essential
to keeping arbitration fair, because it ensures that the arbitrator will not be unduly biased.
Article 14 also creates a new protection not included in the UNCITRAL Rules.63
This article doubles the amount of time given to the parties to bring a challenge against an
arbitrator.64 As has been stated, in arbitration involving human rights, there is a strong
possibility of less sophisticated parties who may not be able to retain representation. By
increasing the amount of time a party has to challenge an arbitrator, parties who may not
be able to retain representation have a better chance of realizing they have the right to
challenge an arbitrator they feel is inappropriate, and thus, have a better chance at ensuring
a fair arbitration for themselves.
3. Arbitral proceedings
The third section encompasses articles that relate to the actual arbitral proceeding.65
The articles include general provisions, multiparty claims, place of arbitration, language,
statement of claim, statement of defence, amendments to the claim or defence, objections
to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, objections to claims or defences manifestly
without merit, further written statements, submission by a third person, periods of time,
interim measures, emergency arbitrator, evidence, hearings, experts appointed by the
arbitral tribunal, default, closure of hearings, and waiver of right to object.66
Perhaps the most significant article of this section is Article 19, which creates the
possibility of claimants bringing class action arbitration.67 Granting parties the right to
bring a class action in arbitration is incredibly important, because class actions are essential
in ensuring justice is brought in situations where the costs of arbitration outweigh the
potential compensation. In situations where parties may not have the ability to pay for the

60

Simma et al., supra note 47.

61

Id. at 30-32.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 33-34.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 6-7

66

Id. at 39-40.

67

Id.

146

arbitration on their own, the parties can still ensure that businesses that are violating human
rights do not get away with their conduct by utilizing class action arbitration.
Article 26 is a potentially problematic article as it creates an “expedited procedure”
to drop claims that appear to be frivolous, unfounded, etc. at an early stage of the
arbitration.68 Seemingly, this means that arbitral tribunals can throw out claims of alleged
human rights violations without looking further into them. Given that business and human
rights arbitration is certainly going to lead to some arbitration between unsophisticated
parties and highly sophisticated parties, creating an expedited process for disposing of
claims seems dangerous. For example, a factory worker brings a claim against his
employer, alleging that the company violated his human rights. The factory worker already
agreed to arbitrate all issues arising from human rights violations in his employment
contract. The company had greater bargaining power in negotiating the employment
contract and, as a result, was able to choose the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal. The company
could easily have chosen an arbitrator or arbitral tribunal who has agreed to toss out any
claim against the company. Admittedly, this could have been a scenario prior to the Hague
Rules. Now, however, the drafters have given arbitral tribunals the go ahead to dispose of
claims at an early stage of the arbitration.69 This may result in claims that should have been
heard never being fully arbitrated. The commentary mentions that this article was created
with the concern that parties may bring unfounded claims that result in high costs and
“reputational consequences” for the respondents.70 Although the drafters also noted that
the article can protect claimants from unfounded defenses with true purposes of
intimidation.71
4. Transparency
The fourth section regards the transparency expected out of the arbitral
proceeding.72 The articles include the scope of application of transparency provisions,
publication of information at the commencement of arbitral proceedings, publication of
documents, public hearings, exceptions to transparency, and repository of published
information.73
Article 40 covers which documents from the arbitral proceeding should be made
public.74 The documents the drafters believe should be made public include “the notice of
68
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arbitration, the response to the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the statement
of defence, . . . the orders, decisions and awards of the arbitral tribunal.”75 Additionally, if
applicable, the drafters believe a table of exhibits, expert reports, and witness statements
should be made public, as well.76 In the commentary, the drafters note that arbitral tribunals
are welcome to make additional documents public as well.77 Specifically, the drafters note
that the arbitral tribunal should consider “the objectives of business and human rights
proceedings” when deciding whether additional documents should be made public.78
Giving the arbitral tribunal power to publish documents related to the arbitral proceedings
is important to furthering human rights, because it can bring greater attention to the issues
in question. In turn, human rights organizations may be able to educate themselves and
advocate for others in efforts to prevent similar situations that could potentially result in
human rights abuses. Rather than including this power of discretion regarding publication
of documents in the commentary, the drafters should have included this as a provision of
the actual article. The power should have been included in the article itself, because,
presumably, parties are not adopting the commentary but the articles and provisions
themselves.
5. The award
The fifth section contains the articles that pertain to the award of the arbitration.79
The articles include the decisions, the form and effect of the award, the applicable law,
settlement or other grounds for termination, the interpretation of the award, correction of
the award, additional award, definition of costs, the fees and expenses of arbitrators, the
allocation of costs, and the deposit of costs.80
Article 45 governs the form and effect of the award.81 Specifically, provision four
mandates that the arbitral tribunal should give reasons for how the award is human rights
compatible.82 Requiring the arbitral tribunal to state specifically how the award is human
rights compatible is a good step in the direction of ensuring parties are receiving fair
arbitration because it requires the arbitral tribunal to remain conscious of the human rights
impact. However, the drafters fail to provide any information on what “human rights
75
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compatible” means.83 Although the drafters designate the Permanent Court of Arbitration
as the default arbitrator appointing authority due to its experience and expertise in business
and human rights arbitration, parties are not required to adhere to this designation.84 So,
while the Permanent Court of Arbitration may be trusted to appoint arbitrators who are
experienced in the relevant area and have the capability to interpret “human rights
compatible,” other institutions may not be deserving of the same trust. In order to ensure
appropriate awards whether the Permanent Court of Arbitration is used or not, the drafters
should have included extra guidance on what “human rights compatible” means.
Article 53 governs the allocation of costs.85 The Hague Rules adopt the traditional
rule that the unsuccessful party bears the costs of the arbitration.86 The reasoning for this
rule is two-fold. First, it prevents parties from bringing unfounded claims.87 Second, it
makes it more feasible for indigent parties to seek arbitration.88 The drafters, however,
recognized that this rule may actually serve as a deterrent of arbitration in the business and
human rights arbitration context. So, the drafters gave the power to the arbitral tribunal to
split costs as the tribunal deems “reasonable” after taking into account the “conduct of the
parties in the arbitration, the financial burden on each party and the public interest . . .”89
By giving the arbitral tribunal the power to split costs as it sees fit, the drafters protected
economically weaker parties’ opportunity to arbitrate by providing assurance that even if
the arbitrator(s) do not decide in their favor, they are not necessarily saddled with the costs
of arbitration.
III.

WHERE THE FINAL HAGUE RULES COULD BE IMPROVED UPON
A. Picking and Choosing Provisions

Arbitration is meant to be independent and allow for greater autonomy of the
arbitrating parties.90 This independence and autonomy is reflected by the fact that parties
See Simma et al., supra note 47. In the commentary on Article 45, the drafters note that “[t]he arbitral
tribunal has discretion to interpret [human rights compatibility] and what is required in order for its award to
be rights-compatible.”
83

84

Id.

85

Id. at 87.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

American Bar Association, Dispute Resolution Processes Arbitration, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProcesses/arbitration/.

149

who agree to use the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration in their
arbitration may pick and choose which provisions they wish to implement.91 In situations
where one arbitrating party has greater power than the other party the more powerful party
could choose to disregard the provisions that are intended to provide protections against
abuse of power.92 Unfortunately, several articles in the Hague Rules are essential for
ensuring that parties receive fair arbitration, and there is no protection from one party
derogating from those articles. For example, Article 5 ensures that in situations where one
party is unrepresented the tribunal may adopt a more “proactive and inquisitorial” process
rather than adversarial.93 If parties are allowed to disregard this provision when they agree
to arbitrate under the Hague Rules, then parties who are already at a disadvantage can
become even more disadvantaged. So, the less sophisticated party would be thrown into an
adversarial situation without representation when the tribunal could actually be acting in a
more helpful manner if the rules were strictly implemented.94
Similarly, Article 11 prohibits people previously involved in the dispute from being
appointed as an arbitrator.95 Article 11 additionally prohibits arbitrators of the same
nationality as one of the parties from being appointed.96 Both parts of this provision are
intended to ensure impartiality.97 But if a party can disregard this Article, then the party
chips away at the rationale for arbitrating human rights issues. The rationale being that
some court systems cannot ensure a fair trial.98 By giving parties the opportunity to appoint
arbitrators who have been involved in some manner or who share the same nationality with
a party invites the possibility of bias back into the arbitration process.
Article 19 allows class actions.99 Class actions are important because they allow for
the litigation of claims that generally do not have a large payout. If an individual believes
they have a claim, but the cost of litigation—or even arbitration—would outweigh any
award the individual may win, the individual is unlikely to pursue the claim alone. And
then the would-be respondent—assuming the respondent is acting illegally—would
continue to get away with whatever illegal activity it engages in, evading justice. In a class
action, the harmed individuals can band together with other harmed individuals, mitigating
the costs of litigation to each one until the potential award outweighs the cost of litigation
91
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or arbitration. However, a corporate party may enter into an arbitration agreement with its
employees which derogates Article 19, which likely greatly decreases the possibility of the
employees bringing action against the corporate party for human rights violations.
To prevent the issues discussed above, rather than the provision allowing for the
parties to choose whichever articles they want to abide by, the provision could apply only
to certain articles. The drafters should have decided which articles are imperative to
ensuring a fair arbitration process and prohibited parties from derogating from those
specific articles. Of course, this is difficult given that arbitration is meant to allow for great
autonomy, and the inclusion of a provision prohibiting parties to derogate from certain
articles may potentially make the Hague Rules less appealing to parties who are used to
the autonomy afforded by arbitration. One implication to a provision that limits party
autonomy is that fewer parties may agree to use the Hague Rules. This in turn would result
in individuals being forced to arbitrate under rules that are not specifically catered to
business and human rights arbitration.
B. Arbitration as a Replacement for the Judicial System
In the preamble to the Hague Rules, it is written that arbitration is not a complete
replacement of the judicial system.100 However it is unclear in which situations the drafters
of the Hague Rules believe arbitration should be used rather than the judicial system and
vice versa. Because it is unclear when parties should use arbitration and when they should
pursue their claim in the court system, it could lead to issues regarding arbitrability—the
question of whether the claim can be arbitrated.101 Arbitration is meant to be efficient and
an argument of whether or not a claim can be arbitrated will add time and costs to the
arbitration process. By failing to clarify when arbitration should be used rather than the
judicial system, the drafters are taking away from one of the benefits of arbitration.
Although full clarification of when to use arbitration rather than the judicial system may
not have been possible without parties first putting the Hague Rules to use, the drafters
likely could have avoided the deficiency to some degree. The drafters could have imagined
some possible situations where arbitration would be better equipped to handle the issue
than the judicial system and vice versa. If the drafters included at least some examples of
these situations, they could have cut down on the possibility of arbitrability issues and
ensured parties enjoy the benefit of efficiency that is meant to come with arbitration.
C. Class Actions in Arbitration
As discussed above, class actions can be incredibly helpful in ensuring that
individuals receive damages when their rights have been violated and when the payout
would be too small to make the costs of litigation or arbitration worth it. Article 19 provides
for the possibility of class actions, but gives no instruction on how an arbitrator, the
100
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tribunal, or parties should go about dealing with a class action.102 As mentioned, the Hague
Rules provide guidance for business and human rights arbitration between two or more
businesses as well as between businesses and individuals. It is easy to foresee situations
where a business violates multiple individuals’ human rights through the same action. As
mentioned previously, the Hague Rules are adopted from the UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency.103 The UNCITRAL Rules do not have a section on class arbitration.104In
fact, there is a lack of guidance on class arbitration in the arbitration community as a
whole.105 Because arbitrators and arbitral tribunals may not have vast experience with class
action arbitration, the drafters should have provided greater guidance on how class action
arbitration should proceed.
D. Appointing Authority for Appointing Arbitrators
Article 6 of the Hague Rules designates the Permanent Court of Arbitration as the
default appointing authority for appointing arbitrators for business human rights
arbitration.106 The drafters chose the Permanent Court of Arbitration due to its experience
and expertise in the area of business and human rights arbitration.107 Of course, parties that
agree to use the Hague Rules have the authority to choose whether or not to use the
Permanent Court of Arbitration as the appointing authority for their arbitrators.108 As
discussed above, parties are inclined to use arbitration because parties are allowed greater
autonomy than they receive from the court system. However, with a matter as serious as
human rights, perhaps the parties’ autonomy should be a bit limited. If the drafters did not
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want to limit the autonomy of parties to the degree of only allowing the Permanent Court
of Arbitration as the appointing authority, they should have at least included a list of
appointing authorities that have similar experience as the Permanent Court of Arbitration
has with human rights and business arbitration. The purpose of the Hague Rules is to ensure
the parties receive a fair hearing.109 One way to do this is to make sure that those overseeing
the hearing are well acquainted with human rights. By including a list, the drafters would
still be affording the parties some amount of autonomy as well.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration developed out of the
need to efficiently and fairly hear claims of human rights violations arising out of business
and contracts.110 Specifically, the Hague Rules are meant to provide an alternative to the
judicial system when individuals cannot be assured that the judicial system will provide a
fair and neutral trial and subsequent award. 111 The drafters of the Hague Rules recognized
the need to balance parties’ want for autonomy in arbitration with ensuring protection for
those whose human rights have been violated.112 Overall, the drafters produced a set of
rules that are in need of greater development and clarification. Business and human rights
issues are new to arbitration,113 and the drafters rely too heavily on arbitrators and arbitral
tribunals to interpret the Hague Rules. In a developing field with presumably a small group
of experts, the drafters should not have left so much up to the arbitrators and arbitral
tribunals. Several of the articles are essential to ensuring parties have fair arbitration
proceedings. Unfortunately, many of them are open to interpretation by arbitrators and
arbitral tribunals who may not have experience in human rights. Furthermore, all of the
articles are susceptible to being completely powerless if parties choose to not adopt them.
The drafters should have provided further instruction and explanation in some areas.
Additionally, the drafters should have included a provision in the preamble identifying
which provisions are most important to ensuring fair arbitration and therefore not allowed
to be passed over—even though this would deplete some of the autonomy that typically
comes with arbitration.
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